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preface
	 We live in turbulent times. This begs the question of how the world 
might look once the crisis (or crises) is over. For the wrr Lecture 
2010 we addressed this question by inviting two internationally 
renowned experts in the field of future research: Angela Wilkinson, 
Director of the Futures Programme at Oxford University (uk) and 
John Robinson, Professor of Sustainable Development at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia (ubc) in Vancouver (Canada).
 
 While Wilkinson used scenarios to present different interpretations 
of the financial crisis as a means of challenging deep-rooted assump-
tions and beliefs, Robinson posed questions about thinking in terms 
of ‘crisis’. According to him, a crisis is by definition a short-lived con-
cept and its uses encourages ad hoc, defensive and reactive actions. 
He believes that thinking in terms of ‘crisis’ provides an inadequate 
means of reflecting on change. For him, ‘after the crises’ means ac-
knowledging the need to distance ourselves from thinking in terms 
of crises.
 
 Both Wilkinson and Robinson emphasised in their lectures that the 
ambition of futures research is to lay bare embedded expectations 
and thought processes. It is not so much a matter of describing the 
future itself, but rather of exploring whether existing perceptions are 
adequate for entering that future wisely. Both speakers advocated 
enthusiastic embracing of the openness of the future. They believe 
that anxiety about the future prevents us from seeing promise and 
realising opportunities. Enthusiasm for openness does however 
mean that uncomfortable scenarios also have to be thought through. 
Wilkinson stressed that we need to allow ourselves to learn from 
undesirable, frightening futures. That can offer a counter to the trap 
of seeking overly short-sighted explanations for the present turbu-
lence. Wilkinson refers to this as ‘learning with the future’, which 
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 Both Wilkinson and Robinson stressed that accepting that the future 
is open, but not empty, encourages enthusiasm for action. The fu-
ture is uncertain, precisely because choices and actions taken today 
influence that future. It matters what we do, even if we cannot shape 
the future entirely to our own ends. Wilkinson and Robinson called 
for the passive cry of “what will the future bring us?” to be in aban-
doned in favour of a perspective for action that is focused on that 
future: “where do we want to take the future?”. Robinson stressed 
that this is a normative question. It requires us to answer the ques-
tion of what kind of world we want to live in. Not everything that is 
desirable is also possible. There are constraints, but the challenge is 
to reflect on the basis of the options that are possible about the direc-
tion in which we wish to move. That is not a question on which only 
so-called future experts should be reflecting, but is the core question 
about which society needs to engage in debate.
 
 Visitors who had been hoping for a simple and uniform description 
of the future following the crises may well have been disappointed 
by the lectures delivered by the two speakers. Wilkinson and Rob-
inson turned the perspective around. It is not about what the future 
looks like, they argued; that question is by definition unanswerable. 
The challenge is rather to reflect on what we want to do for the fu-
ture: ‘Don’t ask what the future will do to you, but ask what you can 
do for the future’, to paraphrase John F. Kennedy. Whether future 
research takes the form of two challenging narratives constructed by 
experts (Wilkinson) or of a societal process supported by computer 
gaming (Robinson) is not the sixty-four thousand dollar question. 
The central issue is to learn to make use of futures research and of 
reflections on it in order to tackle the challenges of today in a way 
that is focused on the future.
 
 Part of the task of the wrr is to lock in the current thinking about 
the future. With the Investigation Out of sight: studying the future 
with policy (Uit zicht: toekomstverkennen met beleid) and the wrr 
Lecture 2010, we have attempted to prompt individuals and organi-
sations involved in government to reflect again about the art of look-
ing ahead. It is also for this reason that we are publishing 
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 these two lectures; those who would prefer to ‘(re)visit’ the lectures 
can visit the wrr channel on YouTube via www.wrr.nl.
 
 On behalf of the wrr,
 
 Prof. Marjolein van Asselt (Council member and chair of the wrr 
Lecture 2010) and Prof. André Knottnerus (chairman of the wrr)
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Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great honour to be invited to share my work on futures. I 
would like to thank André Knottnerus and the other members of the 
wrr for this opportunity.
Future changes and challenges have been a hallmark in my own 
career. Educated as a physicist, I started by developing models for 
probabilistic assessments of climate change impacts. In the world of 
business, my interest has been in helping businesses understand and 
address new forms of risk (environmental, social, reputational) and 
explore new opportunity spaces. I spent nearly ten years as a mem-
ber of the Shell scenario team.
Within the past decade, I have had the privilege of directing a num-
ber of international and interdisciplinary scenario-based initiatives 
on varied topics, including the futures of Australia, of water and of 
hiv/aids in Africa. These initiatives differ from the approaches that 
have been taken in developing and using scenarios as part of global 
scientific assessments, such as those conducted by ipcc and mea, in 
that they convene across the scholarship-practice interface to forge 
new collaborations rather than directly targeting policymakers.
I recently joined the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environ-
ment at the University of Oxford. At Oxford, we are working hard to 
establish futures as an important field of scholarship. We are using 
futures methods to conduct research programmes and are develop-
ing programmes of research into futures methods, for example ask-
ing what is actionable foresight, what works, when and why? We 
are also aiming to provide education that equips current and forth-
coming leaders to take responsibility for the future in a manner that 




be yon d t he cr ise s
Today I would like to address three important issues. First, if the 
future is full of uncertainty, what can we do about it? Then I want to 
illustrate the often misunderstood value of scenarios. I will refer to 
the scenarios called Growth and Health that we published last year 
looking beyond the financial crisis. Roland Kupers, a co-author of 
these scenarios, will give you a brief version of the first story and I 
will narrate the second. In the third and final part, I will offer some 
deeper reflections on the opportunities and challenges in realising 
our collective responsibility ‒ as leaders, as parents, as citizens ‒ to 
shape a better future.
1:	If	the	Future	is	Uncertain,	what	can	we	do	about	it?
We live in turbulent times. Change happens. Societies across the 
world are facing complex challenges. Connectivity has become a key 
driver of value and vulnerability, yet many people treat inter-depen-
dency as a matter of choice. The recent financial crisis, the Indian 
Tsunami, the devastating floods in Europe, New Orleans and Paki-
stan, the Gulf of Mexico deepwater oil spill were all events that were 
neither prevented nor effectively anticipated by the hosts of experts 
that are already using sophisticated futures methods.
I am not a futurologist, nor do I claim to know what will happen. I 
am concerned about a social addiction to prediction and the empha-
sis on risk in general, and quantitative risk assessment in particular. 
The emphasis on learning about the future presents the challenge of 
the future as a knowledge gap. To fill that void, we extrapolate the 
past to create fear of the future,  limiting policy and planning to fu-
tures that are a continuation of past experiences. 
We all know the dangers of driving forward whilst looking in the 
rear view mirror. And the more comfortable challenges from assum-
ing we know the road ahead, rather than shouldering responsibility 
for rethinking mobility challenges and options. I suggest that we 
need a better balance between learning about	the future and learn-
ing with futures. Let’s combine extrapolation and forecasting with 
visioning and scenarios. Let’s look at how assumptions about the 
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future impact problem framing and actions today. Learning with	
futures instead of about	the future can help forge the holistic and 
shared understanding needed to address today’s biggest challenges.
Responsibility for the future is now key to humanity’s quest to 
survive and thrive in the next century. Some commentators have 
given only 50:50 odds. Other doomsayers even less. I prefer realistic 
optimism. Exercising this responsibility benefits from asking ques-
tions such as: where might the future take us? Where do we want to 
take the future? And how does the perspective of the future help us 
to see the present situation more clearly? It requires literacy in the 
futures discipline and more reflexive practices if we are to cultivate a 
widespread ability to harness the modern futures toolkit and put it 
to good use. 
I am impressed by heroic efforts to gather more data, develop better 
models and convert uncertainty into risk, but I think our focus on an 
ability to learn about the future is also fed by an obsession with mi-
nimising risk. This has generated a fear of the future and prevents us 
from looking at challenges differently and finding new solutions. We 
need, instead, to look not only at the quality of our futures thinking 
but also at what makes foresight actionable. We need to navigate the 
futures paradox: if we could really know the future, who would be-
lieve us and how could we change it!
The development of a wide range of modern futures methods over 
the past 60 years has created a toolkit that many are unaware of and 
fewer are able to use. The diversity of and within different methods 
learning with futures
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has created confusion and misunderstanding – about scenarios in 
particular. Research into futures practices is essential if we are to 
clarify and enhance practical effectiveness.
However, whilst history is a well established and respectable field of 
scholarly study, futures studies and scholarship are often received 
with suspicion or dismissed as speculative. Sure, there are no facts 
about the future, but the influence of future assumptions in shaping 
our understanding of the present is real and cannot be dismissed. 
Linear futures thinking can only take us so far. Thinking about the 
future as possible and preferable can also help realise more options.
Taking responsibility for the future means we cannot rely on the 
power of dreaming. But visioning is useful for deciding where so-
ciety should go, and anchoring around shared values is one way to 
forge common ground and cope with an uncertain world. Testing 
visions using models and scenarios can help illuminate the pathways 
to more realistic dreams. Being unable to harness and better relate 
different futures methods is similar to having a toolkit filled only 
with different types of hammers! And bad workmen blame their 
tools, so a futures education is needed to equip today’s and tomor-
row’s leaders with the mastery in futures needed to harness the 
modern toolkit to better effect.
The confusion about scenarios provides one explanation of why 
there are questions about the value of work. The diversity within 
methods is particularly noticeable in the case of scenarios. The pur-
poses, clients and settings of scenario work are diverse. Scenarios 
are sometimes confused or conflated with other futures methods or 
labelled in terms of good and bad methods. Scenarios are not pro-
jections or forecasts. They are not various runs of a spreadsheet or 
model. Scenarios are not visions, good versus bad stories reflecting 
preferences of the future.
Instead, I invite you to think of scenarios as framing and reframing 
devices. They provide different pairs of eyeglasses to look through 
and see the assumptions we have to make in order to understand our 
world and how it works. The principles of good design vary accord-
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ing to the purpose, setting, clients and users of scenario work. The 
actionability of a set of scenarios rests not only on the quality of the 
research and the number of scenarios developed but also on co-pro-
ducing plausibility between different groups and communities and 
forging the common ground in which new intentions and collabora-
tive action can flourish. Scenarios must connect with the inner most 
mental models of decision makers if they are to be effective in bearing 
fruit in the present. Increasingly, scenarios provide a means to reveal 
and test the meta-narratives – the really big stories – that guide action 
and decision making at the organisational and, even, societal, level.
The Netherlands has a tradition of thinking about the long term. You 
have many decades of experience in building scenarios and using 
scenarios to make big decisions, such as committing € 150 billion to 
sea defences over the next 25 years, in anticipation of climate change 
impacts. This demonstrates how the Netherlands is using scenarios 
in policymaking to protect itself from the future. 
However, this contrasts with the use of scenarios by some in combi-
nation with other methods as a way to reveal and test assumptions in 
order to clarify the present situation and reshape future possibilities. 
In the run-up to the financial crisis, individual banks and some regu-
lators were also developing scenarios as part of their stress-testing 
activities to protect the firm from the future. Banks populated the 
‘fat tail’ distributions of their quantitative risk analysis with specific 
events based on what had happened in the past. In the process, they 
overlooked key assumptions built into their risk models, such as the 
assumption that ‘growth can go on forever’ and dismissed signals of 
change that indicated a less familiar and more uncomfortable future 
context is also plausible. 
For example, one of the ‘scenarios’ developed by the uk fsa (Finan-
cial Services Authority) outlined a ‘Black Rock’ type of situation. 
However, this scenario was regarded as too improbable and taken off 
the table. What this points out is that the real value of scenarios lies 
not in their promise as yet another form of probability analysis, but 
in their use in thinking through less familiar, more uncomfortable 
‘what if ’ questions.
learning with futures
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The scenarios Roland and I will share with you were not designed to 
stress test an individual bank but to reveal deeply held assumptions 
about the financial system held within the financial services sector 
and by other key constituencies of that sector. Think of them as two 
different pairs of spectacles. They are designed to help us see differ-
ent aspects of a dynamic, puzzling, contested and complex situation.
2:	The	Oxford	Scenarios:	Looking	Beyond	the	Crisis
Our ‘Beyond the Financial Crisis’ scenario project started life as a 
voluntary collaboration following the 2008 Oxford Futures Forum, 
which brought together the communities of scenario and sense-
making for the first time. As our group continued to exchange ideas, 
we began to use the unfolding financial situation as a common point 
of reference. We noted that the system became so blinded in the 
pursuit of greater returns that it ran itself off a cliff. Just like Wile E. 
Coyote. In the cartoon story, the drop from the cliff is always fol-
lowed by a huge object crashing down on the already devastated 
Coyote. For us in Europe, that big object might be the Euro!
Our initial insights led us to ask four questions:
1)  How had we all been complicit for decades in manufacturing and 
sustaining the widespread belief in a world of easier and cheaper 
credit and the pursuit of unlimited growth?
2)  Why were early warning signs, such as Warren Buffet’s statement 
about derivatives as ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’, over-
looked time and time again?
3)  Why weren’t more people concerned by the divergence between 
economic assumptions and real world behaviours, when econom-
ics has a significant and pervasive impact on public policy?
4)  Do risk professionals and experts unintentionally promote a mis-
understanding of uncertainty and confuse better analysis with 
better judgement? 
We did not set out to develop a set of scenarios, but decided to de-
velop these two stories as a way to share and continue our learning 
with others. 
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Let’s look back at what was happening in the Netherlands in the pe-
riod of the crisis.
- Both the Netherlands and the uk had embraced the promises of 
Icesave with a vengeance under Central Bank approval.
- At the threshold of the crisis, abn-amro was taken over and 
taken apart by a consortium of rbs, Santander and Fortis.
- The subsequent collapse destroyed one of the banks and led to 
nationalisation of the other amid great anger at the scandal.
- Bankers’ bonuses created an embarrassment of riches that had 
been gained privately at the expense of the public.
- Ironically, its unique fully funded pension system had exposed 
the Netherlands to more market risk than other countries.
The financial crisis was also bringing to light tensions that existed 
under the surface, raising questions such as
- What is the role of banks and the financial system in society: 
shareholder value optimisation or to serve the economy?
- Are institutions such as ser still capable of resolving tensions 
such as the pension crisis?
- Who is accountable for systemic risk?
- Should the Central Bank have looked at the systemic stability of 
the Icelandic financial system, rather than at the single bank?
- What is the place of equality in a country grappling with its egali-
tarian roots?
V O T I N G  Q U E S T I O N  1
So let’s see where we are today in terms of opinions in this room:
- How many of you think the financial crisis is over?
RESULTS: Yes: 6% No: 82% Not sure: 16%
When we asked the same question at the Global Economic Sympo-
sium in Kiel last year, 50% thought the crisis was over. The partici-
pants also thought that both our scenarios were equally plausible.
learning with futures
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Our starting-point was to stay with the problem rather than jump to 
the question of how to fix the crisis. We asked “What sort of crisis is 
this?” and “What do the different responses to the crisis imply about 
the futures they will create?”.
There were so many different ‘root cause’ diagnoses of the crisis. 
In each case, people pulled at parts of a holistic and complex set of 
challenges and proposed solutions that did not fit together. So please 
think of them as two different pairs of spectacles, designed to help 
us see different aspects of a dynamic, puzzling, contested and com-
plex situation. Let me now hand over to Roland Kupers who will 
invite you to put on the first set of spectacles.
Growth
Put	on	red	glasses
Let me take you into the world of Growth, looking through a pair of 
red glasses, a world where the map is drawn, the horizon is visible 
and, through the path of analysis, we know what to do.
Take	off	red	glasses
Imagine that you are the ceo of a large financial institution. Your 
office predictably lies on the top floor of a shiny skyscraper. You look 
out the window and see the world at your feet. You observe the life 
down there, the bustle of the crowd, the complex traffic streams: 
uncontrollable!
Fortunately, things are different in your professional life. Sure, 
there were very difficult moments at the height of the crisis, and it 
is clear that markets did not deliver on some pretty essential dimen-
sions. However, we are well on our way to fixing the market mecha-
nisms. In the world of Growth, action is taken to solve the crisis by 
strengthening existing regulations and reforming established gover-
nance systems. There is a strong belief that market failures hastened 
the crisis, so the emphasis is on correcting for market failures. In 
short, in Growth we believe we can understand the problem and 
have the ability to fix it. 
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In Growth, the pain of the crisis is shared across many countries, sec-
tors and communities as impacts continue to cascade and ripple into 
the real economy and society over several years. There are urgent at-
tempts to fix the financial system, that is, the many different systems 
that exist at a national level. Countries scramble to stabilise and fix 
their own system before trying to coordinate across regions.
Regulation improves, but at a cost to companies. Financial specu-
lation initially has a bad name, but the blame and fury at bankers’ 
bonuses dies out and ordinary people cling to the hope that specu-
lation allocates capital efficiently, or at least more efficiently than 
most governments! Governments continue to support banks – as the 
most efficient way to move out of recession – although much of the 
investment seems to benefit the old economy rather than stimulate 
a greener economy. The old laws often reign because the new laws 
have not been drafted yet.
And there is a power struggle as two financial centres in ShangKong 
and Frankfurt-New York battle for the prize. Who will define the 
new rules of the game? Following a period of rapid de-leveraging and 
economic chaos, some countries begin to emerge. There is light at 
the end of the tunnel. And just because some of the worst-hit econo-
mies are small, their impacts cascade as problems worsen.
In Growth, policymakers act on their insights. For example, pension 
reform is actually undertaken and the structural problems are ad-
dressed. The ostrich lifts its head out of the sand.
	
In the run-up to the crisis, innovative options propagated and hid 
risk. When these instruments failed, there was fear and a breakdown 
of trust. The bottom of the financial market turned out to be made of 
cardboard, and so it collapsed. Liquidity vaporised almost overnight. 
The global economic growth machine ran out of the lubricant of 
capitalism, cheap and easy credit.
In fixing the crisis, attention focuses on introducing systems to help 
regulators and banks restore trust and release liquidity. To repair 
market failures, there is an increase in transparency. Technology is 
used to provide better data, and there is confidence that automated 
learning with futures
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real-time early-warning systems are more effective than their hu-
man equivalents. There is also attention for how to manage the stuff 
outside the growth machine.
In Growth, environmental externalities are brought in from the cold. 
Climate change is considered mainly as a market failure, and pricing 
carbon opens new opportunities for the role of finance, enterprise 
and technology to be harnessed in addressing environmental chal-
lenges. 
In Growth, markets slowly regain trust and are managed in such a 
way that carbon prices have become relevant. Not like in the first 
decade of this century, when you will remember it was all a bit of a 
joke. Now hands are joined, while all parties are still looking after 
their own self-interests.
Growth also has a heart. Social fairness is a priority and, in Europe 
at least, in Growth the institutional capacity exists to act and ensure 
this. This enables Growth to set social goals and also realise them. 
There are many new opportunities for growth. There is also some 
capacity to deflate bubbles in a timely fashion. Transparency and 
information pave the way for managing bubbles.
But underlying questions remain in Growth:
- Are new and better oversight mechanisms and more transparency 
enough?
- Will new financial structures and new environmental markets do 
enough?
- Even if Bubbles can be spotted, will they be avoided?
Are we in for another and even more intense rollercoaster ride, an-
other and even more intense boom and bust? Or have we been casti-
gated by the crisis and learnt from the past to be able to build a more 
stable financial system? 
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V O T I N G  Q U E S T I O N  2
So now that you have heard the story of Growth, I would like to 
invite a second round of voting.
Voting: Is Growth a plausible future?
RESULTS:	Yes:	63%	No:	21%	Not	sure:	16%
Let me now hand back to Angela for the Health scenario.
Health
You may know some people who see the world as Growth, but let 
me tell you it is really Health. So let’s put on a different set of yellow 
spectacles. In 2008, just before the crisis, many people were con-
cerned about how a still growing global population could fit with a 
world of resources constraints, with peaks in oil, water, soil seeming 
to rush forward from the future at the present.
This slide shows the cover of a book called Risk that was published 
by John Adams in 1995:
- The black area of the cover represents the total number of poten-
tially carcinogenic chemicals.
- The yellow square represents the number of chemical carcinogens 
actually identified.
- The small yellow dot represents those that are actually regulated.
- No wonder people are concerned about their safety!
Achieving health rests on prevention rather than cure. If the past was 
better risk management, in Health the future is the search for resil-
ience. Not only in terms of the ability of communities, systems and 
nations to bounce back after shocks, but also the ability of whole sys-
tems to transition from an unhealthy growth regime, fuelled by ever 
easier and cheaper credit and inattention to social and environmental 
costs. In Health the connections between finance, society and ecol-
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In Health, feedback within and between systems is recognised as 
an important source of order and change. Before the crisis, societies 
were beginning to use social media and communications technolo-
gies to harness the power of social feedback. Ordinary people were 
being encouraged to make change happen. us President Barack 
Obama harnessed the power of social feedback in his first election 
campaign with the innovative shift from $20,000 a plate fundraising 
diners, to viral marketing of $20 campaign contributions.
In Health, it is recognised that, whilst markets can provide constant 
feedback on supply and demand and help navigate a more efficient 
way forward, the markets alone cannot be left to determine where 
societies should go. Economic efficiency can be the enemy of societal 
resilience, when taken too far.
In Health, chat rooms, tv debates, webinars focus on questions 
about bankers’ bonuses and the appropriate role of banks in society. 
There is widespread concern that fiscal stimulus has done little more 
than maintain a terminally ill patient on life support at the tax pay-
er’s expense. As public debates intensify, attention also shifts to the 
multiplicity of links between the financial system, the real economy, 
society at large and the state of nature and the global commons.
A diversity of financial instruments, sources and forms of banking 
starts to emerge.
- New financial instruments: social impact bonds.




- New forms of banking: Islamic banks, uk Green Investment 
Bank, ethical banks.
And an increasing number of countries reject solutions that rely on 
‘bigger and bigger’ technology bets. And a new approach to risk-re-
silience emerges in the Boardroom of banks and amongst regulators 
of the global financial system. 
More holistic thinking on the links between finance, society and 
ecology takes off very rapidly in the emerging economies. China, 
castigated as the global environmental laggard during the 1990s, 
emerges ahead in the so-called Green Race. Its eleventh Five-Year 
Plan signals that growth is not the goal but the means of develop-
ment and that the ‘quality of economic growth’ is pivotal to social 
and ecological health. Forging a path forward that resolves the 
growth incongruence implied in over focus on eco-efficiency and 
experimenting with a diversity of solutions that include options 
uncomfortable for Europeans, the political legitimacy of the Chinese 
state continues to derive from the greener growth it realises in the 
tremendous first-mover advantage in sustainability solutions. 
In Health, the diversity of financial sources and systems starts to 
reflect the diversity of the real world in which financial systems are 
embedded. And it is not only ecological diversity that matters. In the 
world of health, biological diversity is not left up to the silver bullet 
solution of ‘one thing fits all’ and alternative approaches emerge to 
simply raise the eco-efficiency of markets. There are diverse models 
of economy, as different as Iceland is from India and operating at 
different scales than just at the global level. Institutional diversity 
is as important as biological diversity, in recognition that dominant 
regimes do not die easily but fight for their survival.
But in a multi-polar world, there are intentional differences of 
Health, and diversity is not universally fair. In Health, addressing in-
equality remains a key necessity in the social ecosystem. In Health, 
green is not a colour, but a spectrum. The creative destruction of the 
market place is utilised by some nations to social benefit, and some 
governments restrict corporations to ensure effective limits to be-
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coming ‘too big to fail’. In the business world, successful companies 
re-invent themselves to navigate plurality and fit the needs of a truly 
globally interconnected and multi-polar world. An increasing num-
ber of governments place emphasis on and investment in societal 
resilience, building the adaptive capacity needed for their whole 
societies to overcome cultural, political, social and technological 
inertia and continuously reinvent themselves.
In Health, we are all sailing uncharted oceans and continuously navi-
gate between the promising winds of growth and the strong currents 
of healthy interconnections. Resilience reframes the decade old para-
digm of eco-efficiency based sustainability – rather than Descartian 
dichotomies there is more attention to achieving a healthy dynamic: 
exploitation and exploration, efficiency and resilience, enterprise 
and environment. In Health, there is greater attention to harness-
ing disagreement as an asset and exploring the social and normative 
uncertainties that shape our understanding of systems dynamics and 
network characteristics. There is more attention to how our hopes or 
fears – how unchecked assumptions shaped by our expectations of 
the future can cloud and obscure the quality of our judgement. There 
is greater balance between looking for signals to confirm what we 
expect and thinking the unthinkable. Is a network too stable, does it 
have the capacity to adapt, might its present structure amplify a cri-
sis or absorb its effect?
Compare a study of the New York Fedwire interbank flows, repre-
senting $1.2 trillion of daily transactions to the study of the electric 
power grids, and we can ask: can you avoid a brown-out by having 
the right network design? Of course, one key difference is that elec-
tric power grids are actually designed, whereas banking networks 
grow pretty much organically.
To determine whether the connections are really healthy, you need 
more than just the flows and topology; in Health there is attention to 
the role of social factors, such as the wisdom of crowds, the spread of 
rumours and herd effects. 
Yet in Health, underlying questions remain:
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- Can media tolerate the resilience rhetoric of policymakers?
- Can people accept the social changes and tensions that come with 
sustainability?
- Do the long-term benefits justify the short-term uncertainties?
V O T I N G  Q U E S T I O N  3
So now that you have heard the story of Health, I would like to  
invite a third round of voting.
Is health a plausible future?
RESULTS: Yes: 56% No: 22% Not sure: 22% 
Let’s look at both scenarios.
This table provides a comparison of some of the key dimensions of 
Growth and Health. As I mentioned earlier, they are not designed to 
be preferences or prescriptions. You may find that after hearing these 
two stories you have a preference for Growth or Health. We are all 
conditioned to think of the future as a dichotomy: the good versus 
the bad future. One of my Indian colleagues once commented to 
me about what he saw as the poverty Western imagination to think 
beyond Heaven and Hell. If you do have a preference for either, I sug-
gest you ask yourself why and consider which aspects you may have 
filtered out. Learning with futures requires that we can challenge 
ourselves to learn from futures we do not like or want. 
Learning to ask better questions about the role of future assumptions 
in the present can help us avoid the pitfalls of premature problem 
framing. Last year, we published a paper describing our scenarios as 
‘canaries of the mind’.  In coal mining, a canary was often used to 
detect if methane gas had been released from a coal seam: as long as 
the bird was alive and singing, the miners knew it was safe to breathe 
the air. Sadly, recent events in New Zealand show the dangers of coal 
mining. The coal miner is a hero figure often working at the limits, 
producing value by persisting with uncomfortable and dangerous 
conditions. Without vigilance to changing conditions, no-one can 
survive and thrive in uncertainty.
learning with futures
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Similarly, scenarios provide a way of safely rehearsing the future 
and for thinking through the longer term consequences of today’s 
actions without triggering a toxic reaction that quickly closes down 
any new possibilities. Scenarios can help us remain alert to what is 
inevitable yet unexpected and to navigate between the plural narra-
tives of progress that are still unfolding throughout the world.
V O T I N G  Q U E S T I O N  4
When I asked the questions earlier about whether the crisis is over, 
which crisis were you assuming?
A) Was it a crisis of growth and sorting out how to avoid a pro-
longed 1930s-style depression? What some might call the need 
to return to normalcy?
B) Or are we in the midst of paradigm shift, paying more attention 
to the connections between finance, society and nature?
RESULTS: A: 41% B: 59%
3:	Deeper	Reflections
So let us wave goodbye to Growth and Health and move to the third 
and final part of my lecture. Kant said “Perception without concep-
tion is blind. And conception without perception is empty”. Simply 
put, we see what we expect to see. So how do scenarios help train 
our minds to see the unexpected?
Our start was to focus on the assumptions being made about the 
so-called global financial system. The Growth and Health scenarios 
make different assumptions about the nature of the financial system. 
In Growth, the assumption is that business, nature and society are 
separate, largely self-contained and independent systems. As a re-
sult, environmental and social changes can be treated as externalities 
and priced into the economic system. By contrast, Health assumes 
they are embedded systems. Business-nature-society linkages are 
multiple, hence the emphasis is on the health of connections in 
whole systems. In Health, there are many ways in which these dif-
ferent business-nature-society linkages might be drawn. In Health 
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pricing offers one way to deal with global commons concerns but 
there is no “silver bullet” solution and a variety of “pricing plus” ap-
proaches emerge which include attention to taxation, new oversight 
mechanisms, demand side measures and even alternative commons 
management systems.  
The role of a good set of scenarios is not to determine which form is 
correct but to provide the common vocabulary and shared platform 
for better quality of strategic conversation, which explores the impli-
cations of these different systems assumptions for the nature of the 
crisis and its fix. These scenarios provide different maps to navigate 
the crisis – maps that, if adopted, also reshape the landscape.
As the granddaughter of a Dutch merchant seaman, Cornelius van 
Willigenburg, I have always been fascinated by old sea charts and 
newer maps. Unlike a set of physical maps that have enabled a jour-
ney from one place on earth to another, scenarios are mental maps 
that enable us to journey between the future and the past. They are 
not designed for greater accuracy but for enabling shared under-
standing and better judgement about how the world works.
Let me illustrate. This slide shows two global maps. The map on 
the left uses the Mercator projection. In 1569, Flemish cartographer 
Gerardus Mercator published his first map using his ‘Mercator pro-
jection’ method, which enabled a spherical earth to be mapped onto 
two-dimensional charts. It became the standard map for nautical 
navigation, enabling ships to travel beyond sight of land and across 
vast and open oceans using true north. The Mercator projection, 
however, distorts the size and shape of large objects: on a Mercator 
map, for instance, Greenland looks larger than South America. 
Peter’s Projection provides another way of looking at the world.  
This map depicts the relative size of the continents more accurately. 
Africa now appears massive. It is much less useful, however, for 
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Like any physical set of maps, the value of scenarios is having differ-
ent sets of maps to hand. Unlike a set of physical maps, the real value 
in working with scenarios is their role in revealing assumptions that 
shape the future. This brings me nicely to the challenges of engaging 
with uncertainty about the world out there and dealing with cogni-
tive limitations and the social and political realities that limit any 
theory of pure rationality, in particular the social construction of 
ignorance. The social construction of ignorance, which stems from 
the purposefulness, risk culture and power structure in any organi-
sation,  helps to explain why clear and present signals of danger are 
ignored, for example such as in the uk and the Netherlands in the 
run-up to Icesave. 
Did people in Amsterdam in 1661 know about Hartmann’s Catholic 
Church - Our Lord in the Attic? Of course the Protestant authori-
ties knew about the hidden church, but they turned a blind eye as 
Amsterdam’s policy was to tolerate the diversity of faiths that flour-
ished in the city. However, in other cases turning a blind eye creates 
a much bigger problem. The concept of known unknowns and the 
unknowable unknowns has been around for many decades. You may 
recall the former us Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s mantra 
on uncertainty. He referred to:
- What we know, we don’t know (uncertainty)
- What we don’t know, we know (denial, social construction of 
ignorance)
- What we don’t know, we don’t know (undiscovered or inherently 
unknowable).
The social construction of ignorance relates to unknown, knowns – 
what others know about but which we, in our community or organi-
sation, cannot know. Addressing the social construction of ignorance 
is not easy; it is a by-product of the efficiency of human organisation. 
You cannot have the one without the other without vigilance to 
the co-evolution of knowledge and ignorance and the difference in 
uncertainty as something ‘out there’ or ‘within’ both the individual 
human mind and the processes of collective society. Engaging with 
ignorance requires shifting from being comfortable about what we 
know and can know, to having the courage to address things others 
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might already know, things we are ignorant about or more comfort-
able not knowing about.
Decision makers also struggle with uncomfortable forms of knowl-
edge e.g. how to deal with differences in expert judgments derived 
on the basis of the same ‘weak’ evidence? Experts struggle to em-
brace ignorance and to find ways to offer opinions whilst avoiding 
the traps of hubris and arrogance. Everyone struggles with less com-
fortable aspects of reality. For example, doctors in the usa invented a 
new disease with a flourishing scientific literature – brittle bone syn-
drome – to explain fractures in children. This new disease prevented 
them from having to consider the much less comfortable reality that 
some parents beat their kids and, in the process, break their bones. 
This is a true story and not the only one of its kind.1 
Addressing uncomfortable knowledge and engaging with ignorance 
requires courage to ask awkward questions. Working with a set of 
scenarios that reveal and test deeply held assumptions can ‘make it 
safe’ to look at the worlds ‘out there’ and ‘within’ and articulate what 
is often known but remains unspoken: the so-called elephants in a 
room. Scenario-based processes can help catalyse and support the 
courageous conversations needed to address the social construction 
of ignorance but only if they avoid the traps and pitfalls of scenario 
work e.g. re-iterating comfortable knowledge and failing to remain 
vigilant to changes in their assumption base. Working with scenarios 
to rehearse crisis situations can enable the courage to look at the 
pitfalls in sticking with well established routines and well practised 
tools.
Firemen have been known to burn to death in forest fires because 
they fail to drop their heavy axes which impede their escape. Fire-
men become experts in dealing with forest fires through training and 
by learning to recognise the pattern of different types of fires. But 
this capacity for anticipation based on familiar pattern recognition 
can prevent the improvisation needed to deal with new situations. A 
fireman’s axe is not only a heavy tool but also a symbol of his iden-
tity. It is the last thing to be dropped. In some fires, this reluctance to 
drop a very heavy axe has led to death. 
learning with futures
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The clinging of financial analysis to quant models and modelling in 
the run-up to the financial crisis highlights that whole organisations 
and individual experts become identified by their proprietary and 
professional tools. After all, what is a modeller without a model, a 
financial analyst without a spreadsheet or a scenarist without a set of 
scenarios? 
We must all learn to drop our heavy tools and work with lighter 
tools. Dealing with turbulent changes and managing through crisis 
is about navigating unfamiliar situations. It requires improvisation. 
Otherwise we run the risk of making matters worse by sticking to 
our established ways of working and familiar tools. In securing the 
opportunity to learn and unlearn with the future, I see the value of 
scenarios as lighter tools – providing more flexible and temporary 
scaffolding – that can complement the much heavier and harder-to-
drop tools of data-heavy models.
In Health, the challenges of navigating a world of complex link-
ages require a new mindset, as well as the tools and institutions, to 
understand and manage a diversity of linkages between different 
systems and geographical scales. In harnessing the modern futures 
toolkit, we must also pay attention to time matters and think about 
the influence of temporality in creating different scales of meaning. 
Let me illustrate this point with this slide, a painting by Vermeer, De	
Schilderkunst, from the golden age of Dutch map making that is rel-
evant to the challenge of facing climate change today. 
The painting shows a scene of everyday life. On the back wall hangs 
a tapestry showing a map of the world. Just imagine the stories peo-
ple would have told to make sense of this whole, round world.
Today we face a similar situation. Climate change is now a feature 
of our global map. We have established a truly amazing process of 
global scientific assessment through the scenario work of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, which is a hybridization of 
scenarios and modelling. But while careful surveys, such as Globe-
scan, demonstrate a high degree of concern everywhere, people 
struggle to be supportive of action at their own scale. My interest 
in scenarios stems from their ability to relate these many different 
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scales by remaining ‘light tools’ with the flexibility to focus and refo-
cus at different scales in subsequent rounds of building and use. 
The value of stories and storytelling processes in scenario work is 
also pivotal in relating these scales of meaning. The process of co-
creating plausible stories through conversation and storytelling is es-
sential in revealing meaningful anticipatory knowledge and forging 
common vocabulary between different communities. John Robin-
son and others are already working with scenarios in a way that en-
ables much wider participation, and I think these wider engagements 
are key to relating global science and local decision-making. In sce-
nario work, we rely on lexicon, rather than mathematics, to indicate 
which stories of the future to pay attention to. Combining scenarios 
(what futures are plausible?) with other futures methods, such as vi-
sioning (where do we want to take the future?) and statistical model-
ling (what constraints from the past might there be in the future?) is 
already the new hallmark of leading edge futures practices.   
Responsibility for the future implies leadership ability to harness 
the modern futures toolkit and to find ways of navigating between 
what Adam Kahane calls an adaptive and activist stance to the future:
The Adaptive stance is a reactive stance that asks ‘Where will the 
future take us?’. It often leads to responses centred on protecting and 
preserving systems and organisations in the face of future changes.
The Activist stance, by contrast, asks ‘Where do we want to take 
the future?’. The focus is then on strategic innovation and creative 
destruction, transforming organisations and institutions to create a 
society that brings forward a better future.
In an era which some leading social scientists, such as Ulrich Beck, 
have referred to as characterised by ‘risk society’ and in which risk 
control has become a dominate feature in regulation and national 
policy making, we  should not shirk the responsibility of shaping a 
better future. That the future is not certain and open to shaping, is 
also greatly empowering, but only if we can learn to learn from the 
inevitable failures that characterise longer term success and progress.
towards a sustainable future
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In conclusion
Scenarios are but one tool in the modern futures toolkit. I believe 
scenarios offer an effective way to engage uncertainty and, in par-
ticular, navigate the social construction of ignorance. However, it 
requires courage to use them in this way. Scenarios offer an opportu-
nity to learn with futures rather than about	the future. Our Growth 
and Health scenarios were designed to help us all take a step back and 
reframe the financial crisis by revealing and testing the deeply held 
assumptions that are impacting today’s decision making and the de-
sign of early warning systems. The value in using scenarios to enable 
and consolidate this deeper learning is often not realised. Futures 
scholarship and futures education are needed if we are to reduce con-
fusion and misunderstanding about scenarios and help leaders make 
better use of the modern futures toolkit.
Let me end with two questions: How prepared are you for the many 
roads ahead and which roads have you helped to build?
Thank you for your attention.
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[i]  One of our colleagues, Dr Jerome Ravetz, has suggested a more publicly accessible 
example of how experts also struggle with uncomfortable knowledge: 'Semmelweis 
syndrome'
For the holders of power and authority, uncomfortable knowledge entails what we may 
call a 'Semmelweis syndrome', based on a real incident in nineteenth-century Vienna[*]. 
In such syndromes the official response by healthcare administrators to a warning of a 
feral future where medical students are unwittingly killing mothers in their facility was 





publicity	about	the	actions	of	a	few	aberrant	priests”[**]. Uncomfortable knowledge 
tends to be suppressed because it ‘sends the wrong message’ about those in power – that 
the authorities got it wrong.
[*] John, Z; Sadler, M.D., Yosaf, F., and Hulgus, M.A.: 1989. Hypothesizing and 
Evidence-Gathering: The Nexus of Understanding. Family Process Volume 28, Issue 
3, pages 255–267, September 1989
[**] Kathryn A. Dale; Judith L. Alpert 2007: Hiding Behind the Cloth: Child 
Sexual Abuse and the Catholic Church Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, Volume 16, 
Issue 3 August 2007 , pages 59 - 74
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It is a great pleasure to be here. This is one of my favorite parts of 
the world to visit (I try to visit the Netherlands once a year) and I ap-
preciate the opportunity to talk to you about some issues that are 
fairly close to my heart and about some of the work we are doing in 
Vancouver. So what I would like to do, after some preliminary re-
marks, is just to set up the kind of work that we have been doing in 
participatory exercises with local communities mostly in our region 
of the world. 
I am going to work with you to create a scenario, using one of the 
modeling tools that we have developed over the past 10 or 15 years, 
which is a computer game, a simulation tool that we use with various 
stakeholders and publics, called Metro Quest. These normally take 
3 or 4 hours. We are going to do it in 20 minutes so that is going to 
be a subset of the whole but hopefully it will give you a flavor of the 
kind of things we do to engage citizens in thinking about the future. I 
will close with some reflections about a way forward and how we can 
move more actively in the direction of engaging many more people in 
thinking about the future of their region, their city, and their neigh-
borhood.
The context for what I am going to say are several things I want to 
take from the report that was produced for the wrr on foresight in 
September. An excellent report, I have only read the English sum-
mary version of it, but I want to take a few things from that report 
because I think they really set up what I want to say very nicely:
• The idea that the future is open but not empty. I think that is ac-
tually a profound insight that is worth elaborating on, and I think 
Angela’s remarks are very consistent with this insight as well. 
towards a sustainable future: choices , constraints, and interactivity?
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• The idea of an uncertainty as what is called a ‘cognitive uncer-
tainty’ in that report. We have a lot of uncertainty about social 
and normative issues, and this results from the fact that, unlike 
in climate modeling, climate science, or much other natural sci-
ence, within the field of observation of the social sciences there is 
human consciousness, which has volition or intentionality  that 
changes the nature of the whole exercise in a fairly fundamental 
way.
• We are really trying to juggle different views, and Angela has 
already given you some really powerful examples of the degree to 
which the framing of the problem can change the whole nature 
of the diagnosis and the proposed solution. This, then, is what 
we called the blind spot in the report about normative participa-
tory future studies. I think there is a real opportunity in that area.
• Our work has led us to conclude that the fundamental spatial 
scale, even for global issues such as climate change, is increas-
ingly below the national level. Now, in our country, below the 
national level means a lot further below, spatially speaking, than 
it is in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the question of where the 
locus of agency is, is a very interesting one, and the failure of the 
process at the international level has led a lot of people to suggest 
that the interesting activity areas like climate change is happen-
ing at a more local level. We have certainly found in Canada that 
it is very depressing to deal with the national government on cli-
mate change. It is far more interesting to deal with our provincial 
government and their municipalities, so let’s focus on cities.
• The night before last, I read a report about foreign policy in the 
Netherlands and the future of foreign policy. The report high-
lights the concept of the network world we are increasingly mov-
ing into: we only need to turn to our children to see a completely 
different set of social relationships and behaviors that are derived 
from this highly interconnected form of interaction that happens 
through the social media. The concept of a transparent delibera-
tion framework is exactly the type of thing I will be arguing for. 
I want to ask the same question Angela also asked: what kind of 
world do we want to live in? 
• And then, finally, this idea of learning with and not about the 
future, this is really a fundamental shift in perspective from 
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thinking that there is something out there that we can describe 
and cover and see to, thinking that it is a process of learning as 
much about us now as about the future, examining scenarios as 
mental maps or as tools framing tools. In a way, the question that 
lies behind everything I am going to say, is: where do we want to 
take the future?
A normative ideal within much of the scientific community is the 
idea that prediction equals understanding, and, therefore, the goal is 
to converge on likelihood. We want to find the most likely future and 
that is the base case: that is the one that will happen if nothing else 
occurs. The key point here is scenarios are not predictions, they do 
not converge on likelihood, and they are typically incommensurable. 
They are not reducible to each other; they are not variants of the base 
case; and they are not derivable from each other. They are actually 
fundamentally different logics. This is in some ways the basic insight 
of scenario analysis.
What I want to add to that is a third approach which we have been 
trying to work with for the past 20 years or so of talking about how to 
get to desirable futures. What makes this whole exercise more explic-
itly normative? I would argue it is always normative, but the norma-
tive nature is usually hidden in a predictive framing. Let’s make this 
more explicitly normative and start talking about the desirability of 
futures, not simply likelihood but not even multiplicity. So the ques-
tion is: how do we make this third approach operational? This has 
been a lot of the work we have been doing over the last few decades.
I want to say a word or two about uncertainty, using the example of 
the intergovernmental panel on climate change because it is such a 
perfect case study of this issue. What we have in ipcc is three working 
groups: working group 1 on the science of climate change itself (which 
is the one everybody knows), working group 2 on impacts and adap-
tation, and working group 3 on mitigation. What may be less appreci-
ated is that these are completely different communities with a very 
different center of gravity in their disciplinary expertise. The physical 
science community makes up almost all of working group 1. Working 
group 2 has a preponderance of ecologists and biologists as a sort of 
towards a sustainable future: choices , constraints, and interactivity?
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environmental science community. Working group 3 is the catch all 
for all of the other social sciences and a lot of economists as well. 
Working group 3 did scenario work on the emission side, and what 
happened is very interesting. In the second and third assessment re-
ports and especially in the fourth, what we had was this huge process 
of trying to establish a common approach to uncertainty so that the 
language between the three reports would be the same. Because there 
was a response from various audiences and governments saying: 
“you are saying different things in these reports about uncertainty, 
they’re commensurable, and we can’t relate them to each other,” so 
quite a large process was started. A massive email blitz went around, 
and meetings and discussions were held to try and come up with a 
common framework for uncertainty. 
This basically failed in my view despite the attempt to put a good 
face on it and have a language that was consistent across the reports. 
It does not work very well, and the reason it does not is that we are 
talking about three different ways of thinking about uncertainty: 
one based on likelihood, one based on confidence, and one based on 
choice. Likelihood is a probabilistic assessment of what the world is 
like: our best judgment of what the probability of the outcome is. 
Working group 1 tended to adopt more of a likelihood approach of 
thinking about the future of climate systems. The environmental 
scientists tended to focus just a little more – this is just my anecdotal 
impression – on the confidence question: how much confidence do 
we have in these statements about the future? And this is a different 
thing because that’s locating uncertainty in the head of the scientist, 
not in the world. If you read the report, you will see that these two are 
conflated, and both kinds of statements are now in the reports, but 
they mean different things, and different communities were promot-
ing them. 
Now I am going to focus on a subgroup in working group 3, which 
was the scenarios people. I was the convening lead author of the 
scenarios chapter in the third assessment report, and basically what 
we were doing was saying: that’s the wrong question, confidence or 
likelihood, for if we are talking about socio-economic systems with 
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humans in them with intentionality and volition, likelihood is not a 
very useful concept, and confidence is not something we can express. 
We cannot even predict quarterly gdp three months ahead so we are 
talking about hundred year scenarios? As a result of such consid-
erations. the special report on emission scenarios ended up taking 
a scenarios approach. It said there are four fundamentally different fu-
tures, and they cannot be reduced to each other or expressed in terms 
of each other. They are different worlds and to some extent – not 
entirely – it is a question of choice. That is very different from natural 
science, where we do not usually impute a certain amount of choice 
to what is going on there, but in socio economic systems, confidence 
and probability are not the best ways to think about uncertainty. 
I want to pick up on this idea of choice because it underlies the work 
we do, and I will be following this theme through a little bit. If it is 
about choice, then that raises the question: who chooses? This leads 
us to a need for a participatory approach to scenario analysis. Scenario 
analysis is not just communicated out to the public and stakeholders, 
but it actually involves the participants, the audience, in the creation 
of the scenarios themselves. There is a very familiar reason why we 
might want to think about more participative approaches: there are 
normative reasons, and people have the right to be involved in the 
discussion about futures that are going to affect them. This is a pretty 
obvious reason for participatory approaches. 
However, there are substantive reasons as well. There is certainly 
an argument that a more participatory process in principle increases 
the quality of decisions, bringing into the analysis information that 
is not available to the scholars and the experts creating the scenarios. 
There is, first of all, ethical and political input, which actually is not 
the province of the experts anyway as most experts try to remove this 
dimension from their work. If we are going to have deeply ethically 
and political decisions, we need input from the people that are going 
to be affected and who have some say in those issues as citizens. Local 
knowledge is another input. Finally, there is a set of instrumental rea-
sons for participatory approaches which are actually becoming more 
and more important as our world fragments into anger and mistrust, 
and we see this happening across the planet. In every country, cer-
towards a sustainable future: choices , constraints, and interactivity?
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tainly in the Netherlands and in Canada, such levels of mistrust and 
anger are historically unprecedented at least in the last few decades. 
In those circumstances especially, we need processes that are going to 
allow people to feel somehow part of it. If people feel imposed upon 
by various types of elites, then they will be resistant in principle.
Can we create processes that are going to lead to enough sense of 
ownership for the results of the process to be more widely accepted? 
That is the opportunity, the instrumental opportunity, of a participa-
tory approach to processes. This has led us to what we call second or-
der backcasting. First order backcasting was that we, the researchers, 
would identify some desirable futures and do an analysis of how to 
get there. As I just said, we are trying to move this into a more partici-
patory direction. So what we are trying to do is to combine scenarios 
and traditional analysis with backcasting and types of participatory 
processes where we do not start with our articulated desired future, 
but where we start with a set of goals that have to reflect the audience. 
So we start with a process of eliciting what the goals are from people 
such as this group in this room, and those goals do not define out-
comes, they define a kind of color of the future. 
Then we launch a process of creating scenarios: we take a scenario 
into the future, we see where it takes us, and then we compare. Is that 
future consistent with the goals? We keep doing this and we keep 
repeating scenario creation until we get to a future that is consistent 
with our goals. That is the one we want, and that becomes our objec-
tive. Now we can look at ways of getting there from here. So you see 
the crucial component here is to align the scenario with a goal and 
to have the goal emerge out of the process rather than to be imposed 
from the outside. 
This in turn leads us to a procedural definition of sustainability. You 
all know that sustainability is an essentially contested concept that 
has many different definitions. There are many people who think 
there is a problem with the concept of sustainability. I think the op-
posite. We have managed to get by for 2000 years with multiple 
concepts of truth, justice, and democracy, and somehow that has 
not stopped us from developing legal systems and political systems. 
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I think sustainability is one of those types of concepts, an essen-
tially contested concept, and the contestation is part of the process 
of deciding of where you want to be. So we define sustainability in 
the light of that type of approach as an emergent property. It is not 
a scientific concept. Sustainability is basically a normative, ethical 
concept in our view that is emergent from a process of discussion and 
dialogue among a community.  This is where the science comes in, to 
give us some understanding of the higher order ecological, economic, 
and social consequences and the trade-offs associated with different 
choices, and different courses of action. This is crucial. These are the 
choices we have, and choices give rise to different consequences, and 
these in turn go into the discussion of future.
In other words, sustainability and desirability conflate to some de-
gree. In many years of doing this, I have never met anybody who 
argued for unsustainability; maybe there are people but I have never 
met anyone. What we argue about is what we mean by sustainability 
and what is indeed sustainable. That is exactly the argument we need 
to have; that is the discussion we require. What set of outcomes are 
acceptable? What trade-offs are we willing to make? Put another way, 
we need to take lots of expert understanding, which is located partly 
in the universities, party in industry, and partly in government and 
combine it with public attitudes, values, norms, perceptions, and 
beliefs. By creating processes and tools that bring these two types of 
understanding together and give rise to this emerging property, we 
may potentially get some type of agreement on where we want to go. 
So this is the promise; this is the ideal.
Reality, of course, is a little messier. This means that we need some 
tools that allow these two forms of knowledge to be combined. We 
want to locate our tools in between. We need the world of models, 
and the quantification of outcomes is crucial to this kind of exercise 
because otherwise it is just conversation, conversation uninformed 
by any technical analysis of consequences and trade-offs. We want 
some modeling, but people do not live in model land. In our normal 
everyday life, even we, the academics who are much more focused 
on this type of analysis than anyone else in the world, even we in our 
normal lives do not sit down with our partners and do an analysis of 
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our relationship. This is not how we live our lives.
Instead we live our lives in story land, as narratives. We tell each 
other stories about our relationships or about our friends. This has 
been the medium of exchange for the whole planet from the dawn of 
time, and yet we think that, somehow, purely technical analysis can 
translate directly into the experience of individuals that do not have 
any technical training. This does not happen. When we show people 
charts and diagrams, their eyes glaze over in ten seconds, as they 
are not communicating in a way that is meaningful to them. So we 
need to deal with narrative. As we try to locate our tools in between 
the world of models and the world of stories, narrative is the way in 
which we can engage people more deeply. 
So, for example, in the interface you will see in a few minutes, no 
number ever appears. Underneath the hood are all kinds of algorith-
mic calculations, but the dashboard is qualitative. What is the chal-
lenge, the modeling challenge? I would like to quote Pierre Wack, 
whose two famous 1985 articles (wonderful articles, actually, even 
today) in the Harvard Business Review said something very pro-
found: “the purpose of modeling is not to describe the world: it is to 
change the mental model in the heads of the audience.” That is a re-
ally interesting idea. You heard Angela talking actually about just this 
question: what are these mental models? How do we bring them out 
and examine them, unpack them and understand them? 
Then we met with John Hiles. He ran a company called Thinking 
Tools which was the business division of Maxis Corporation, all the 
Sims products. He did business simulations. He built Sim Refinery 
for Chevron and Sim Health for the health system in the us. He said 
something really interesting: “most people on earth are alienated 
from the large systems of technology, politics, and economics. And 
they are alienated from them not because they lack information. The 
Sunday New York Times has more information on all those systems 
every week than anyone can absorb. There is no lack of information, 
but it is not actually information to most people. It is just noise. And 
it is noise because we do not have a mental model to make sense of 
it. Interest rates go up, and if we understand a bit of economics, we 
might understand what is going on. Otherwise what do we do? We 
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rely on the columnist that we like to explain it to us, and we might 
like that columnist because he is kind of handsome or we might like 
him for reasons that have nothing to do with economics but he is the 
one we will turn to because we do not have a mental model to explain 
that phenomenon. As we cannot have expert models on most phe-
nomena in society, so we depend on others.”
If you combine these two quotes, you will see the huge opportunity 
for tools that will give people mental models to make sense of noise. 
Sense making is a term that I know Angela likes. But always remem-
ber Neil Postman’s warning many years ago: “Information is the 
garbage of the 1990s.” I think this warning holds true for this decade 
as well. 
All of this is background to the tool we built called Metro Quest. 
QUEST originally stood  for Quasi Understandable Ecosystem 
Scenario Tool. We were trying to turn this into a quite useful eco sce-
nario system tool, and you may judge for yourselves whether we have 
achieved that. We have sold the software to 18 cities around North 
America so there is quite a bit of experience now of using this on an 
urban scale and now I want to take you through it. 
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We are going to imagine we are doing a Metro Quest session. 
Unfortunately, we only have North American cities, so it will be a 
little different in context. I am going to start with a few slides to give 
you a feel of the kind of issues we grapple with. We did not have a The 
Hague or an Amsterdam Metro Quest to show to you, so this is the 
very southern tip of Vancouver, the west coast of British Columbia. 
Unlike most European cities, but like most Canadian cities, we are 
growing a lot. We expect a 35% population growth by 2038, which is 
completely migration driven. This is a big growth in a small period 
of time. This, by the way, is what most of the planet is doing outside 
Europe, Japan, and parts of North America. 
Slide 20
So the interesting question about sustainability is: how do we plan for 
a 33% increase? This is the land area available for putting more people 
and houses and roads and infrastructure, but when you start to take 
away the areas you cannot build on such as water, steep slopes, sen-
sitive eco systems, protected species, green lands, nature reserves, 
agricultural land reserve set aside for farming, and built up areas, you 
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can see that the actual amount of land available is relatively small. So 
I hope that this would make you feel like this is more a Dutch situa-
tion, with many constraints and not a lot of room to go. Despite your 
impression of Canada as this infinite expanse of land, a lot of it is not 
very expendable into. So here is the challenge: there is the land that 
is available, and now we are going to add 110,000 people. How do we 
do it? This is what we take out to the public and talk to them about 
land use, about transportation, about urban density, about jobs, about 
energy use and so on and try and figure out if there is a way forward 
that works for people.
So what I am going to do now is take you to the software, on the web 
we choose some priorities and we see the outcomes. I will choose 
five priorities for you and ask you to vote on your top priority. I have 
thrown in a priority that might not be a typically Dutch one but a 
more typically North American priority, but I thought I would just 
give you the chance to be North American if you wanted to. More 
green space – what a surprise – is number one. Number two is quiet 
neighborhoods, I should have done my predictions of your votes. 
Low carbon emissions is number three. Lower cost of living is num-
ber four. Large homes with big yards is number five. At this point, we 
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will move on to making some choices. Having set the priorities, we 
can now make some choices, and we are going to make choices in two 
areas. There are only two questions. Where do we want to develop? 
Do we mostly want this new growth in population and infrastructure 
to take place in new areas, outside the existing urban environment? 
Or do we want to densify and try to fit as many of these people as 
possible into existing built-up areas or some kind of mixture? As you 
can see, the pictures illustrate this to some degree. There is that sub-
urban American house that we all love, in a slightly or significantly 
more densely populated area. So this will be the first choice. 
Your second choice will be on transportation. Some versions of Metro 
Quest have up to six choices on certain issues, but this one just has 
two. Remember we are adding 35% to the population, which is a 
significant number of new people. Do we want to improve the road 
system, which is already inadequate to support the existing level of 
drivers? Or do we really want to focus on drivers? Penalize drivers or 
encourage them or some kind of mix, where we really have to respect 
the God given right to everyone to drive as much as they want but we 
also want good transport. 
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So where do we encourage new development? You can start voting 
now. Imagine that you have been sitting at a table discussing this 
choice with a group of ten other people and try to think through the 
consequences of that. Wow, what a surprise. I think you, as an audi-
ence, are in the right part of the world. If you are planning a move to 
a certain continent a little left on the map, you might have to rethink 
some of your answers. 
Let’s take a look at the outcomes. The first thing you can do is see 
the spatial implications of your choice and zoom in and get a sense 
of what has changed. You have chosen the least new development, 
but you can see the density increase that is happening over time, so 
you really have densified those urban cores by the choices you have 
made. What you can also see here on the screen is your five priorities 
and what you did. You did pretty well on three of them, but you did 
pretty badly on two of them. Two got worse: it is noisier because you 
have densified, and you just did not get those large homes you really 
wanted to have in the suburban area. But you have lowered the cost 
of living because denser infrastructure is more cost-effective to build. 
In our experience, this is an unanticipated consequence. People do 
not make the connection between density and taxes, for example, 
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although once it has been pointed out to them and you walk through 
these things, people can understand those links. So these are our pri-
orities.
You can also look at other people’s potential priorities. From an urban 
lifestyle point of view, not surprisingly, the suburbs hate this; it does 
not do them any good. That is an important point: not everybody is 
happy with the outcome. From a travel point of view, it is a lot bet-
ter because you have densified, and distances are shorter. For the 
environment, it is not so bad, mostly positive, and from a cost point 
of view as well. So you are very virtuous in several points of the out-
comes here. It is always about the diamond in the middle, and you can 
see how that changes over time. You can also compare your scenario 
to the present, and you can also zoom in and zoom out as well to give 
you some sense of what you could do. 
We chose priorities, we made choices, and the third big step is to 
iterate it. Maybe you do not like the outcome, or you do not like the 
consequences of some of the outcomes, and you say: I did not expect 
that, or I really do not like that. At this point you have the opportu-
nity to play, to change the choices, and see the outcome. In the first 
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version, this took six hours, then we got it down to two minutes, and 
now it is zero time because we have pre-run all the scenarios. You 
can actually play until you get to a scenario that the room in general 
is most happy with. That finishes step three, and that can take quite a 
bit of discussion time. 
Step four is actually the most interesting part. That is when you turn 
all this technology off and say: how do we get there from here? That 
is not in the model; that is entirely in the discussion. That is when the 
dialogue becomes the most informative because you have a sense of 
the trade-offs and the consequences of doing this; you may disagree 
on what you like, but at least you have that sort of common frame-
work. 
Now let’s talk about how, and that’s the really good part of the discus-
sion. We do these kinds of exercises using three channels or modes, 
and one is workshops. Here are the four steps I talked about. So there 
is the workshop process, and that is about half a day. You can run doz-
ens of workshops, but you cannot run hundreds of workshops. The 
other way to do it is on the web, so Metro Quest in Chicago, which 
was paid for by the Metropolitan Planning Authority of Chicago, put 
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this on the web, and you could visit 2040, and we would show simu-
lations on how Chicago would develop. They could invent 2040, and 
here you can see they had five choices, so they had more variation, 
more possibility. 
Then they deposited their preferred scenario, and then they could 
compare their scenario to other people’s scenarios and to the official 
scenarios of various organs of government. This becomes an interac-
tive process of learning and depositing. By the way, polls give you ten 
seconds and no context. A workshop like this gives you three hours 
to learn about those same problems and what you deposit at the end 
of the process is in principle a much more useful expression of your 
values and your preferences than you can ever give in a poll. 
We think that these processes can be a more useful input to decision 
making and we have it in kiosks. We have five kiosks in the city of 
Chicago, and people could come and play Metro Quest for a minute 
or two and walk away. There were 500 people per day at the busy 
kiosks. 
It was during the summer of 2009. We had about 1,500 people in 
workshops because we ran 50 workshops in Chicago, which is a lot. 
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We used the workshops to try to push the people to the web, so we sent 
e-mails following up the workshop, saying: here’s the website. Twenty-
two per cent of the people opened their e-mail, which apparently is fairly 
high in that kind of thing, and 5 per cent clicked through and started to play 
Metro Quest online. We had 4,000 visitors online. And then a declining 
number went through the scenario and left it behind. But these are still 
significant numbers. And 20,000 people played it at the kiosks. 
Now think of that, you have millions of workshops going on in the 
Netherlands consensus land, but do they ever involve politically significant 
numbers of people? Typically not, and typically it is the old STP phenom-
enon that you always see here: ‘The Same Ten People’. Oh there they are 
again. There are people that go to meetings, and there are lots of people that 
do not. With these kinds of kiosks and online opportunities, there is the 
possibility of engaging politically significant numbers of a particular com-
munity. This turns it into a whole different ballgame with respect to po-
tential impact on policy. There is a quality/quantity trade-off here that the 
bigger numbers are in much shorter experiences. But it is a new world with 
this new technology.
Let me end with some reflections on the question of crisis, a really simple-
minded conceptional framework I want to put forward where I see some 
of the frontiers of this work, an example of what we are trying to do and an 
end point. This whole question of crisis as we heard in the first half of today 
is kind of interesting and sometimes problematic to think about the issue. 
As we know, everybody’s crisis is someone else’s opportunity: crisis by its 
nature is a short-term concept. If you take a ten-year perspective, it might 
be different, it might be a different kind of crisis, and always the question to 
ask is: who benefits? Who gains and who loses? That is always an informa-
tive question to ask from the framing of terms like crisis: who benefits from 
that, and who loses from that, and from the policies that follow. I think the 
psychology of motivation is very important here. We sometimes think we 
need a crisis to get action because people are so resistant to change. I think 
that’s a misunderstanding of our culture by the way; I think we are the most 
changed culture in the history of humanity, but nevertheless there is this 
feeling that people are resistant to change so crisis will allow us to make the 
transition.
In fact I think it’s the opposite. Crisis leads to very short-term, defensive, 
and reactive thinking, and it does indeed create change, but the change is 
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hardly ever strategic, enlightened, and long-term. Just think of the 
last few natural disasters around the world and what the response 
was to them and how many of them have been long-term thinking 
and how many are just trying to solve an immediate problem. Most of 
the social benefits in the Western world were put in after 1945 at least 
until 1980, when things began to unravel, and they were put in place 
at times of rising expectations and rising welfare. So it is not clear that 
crisis is the right framing for thinking about progressive change.
Here is a very simple framework we use to think about navigating the 
future. Choice is the fundamental point. It is real choice, it’s some-
thing in which we can exercise some choice but there is indeed some 
uncertainty of the cognitive kind and of the kind that I was criticizing 
earlier, and there are constraints, as not every opportunity is actually 
available. To me the interesting question is: let’s identify the ones that 
are still left there and start to make some decisions about which direc-
tion we want to go. That means we need tools that are dynamic over 
time, that are integrated, and that are participatory. Now think of the 
models that are currently used to look at the future. How many meet 
those three conditions? 
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From our work I think there are some preliminary lessons. We get 
incredible enthusiasm when we go out with the stuff. People are re-
ally interested in talking about their communities. Scale is important: 
it is not the country or the province, but it is their city. Temporal scale 
is important: 100 years does not work, but 40 years works. We prefer 
40 years because it allows turnover of capital stock which you need 
to get big change. But it worked for people not for that reason but 
because they can imagine their kids in 40 years. That was the most 
fundamental factor. Or they would be young enough that they will 
still be working in 40 years. So 40 years worked for us, and people got 
very engaged. Interactivity is very crucial. Do not create scenarios and 
give them to people, let them create the scenarios; that is one of the 
biggest things we found. That is when the buying is much higher at 
this local level. Visualization. We have too high credibility, as people 
believe this stuff too much, and they are not so critical, so we have to 
be careful. We see increased knowledge and engagement in some of 
the evaluation of the work we have done.
Our world today is really lacking in the sense of collective agency: 
we are fragmenting. If you look at the literature in this area, there 
are some really interesting things about qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, models versus stories, true to life versus fun to use; there is 
a tension there. My first two grad students working on QUEST called 
themselves Mr. True to Life and Mr. Fun to Use, and that was the 
tension. This becomes a matter of communicative complexity, but it 
is not connecting to policy. All these big projects are done, and then 
they die. People get their expectations up, but nothing happens. How 
we connect this to policy is a really big issue. I will not talk too much 
about this, but there are a lot of frontiers we can go into. 
I want to say one word about landscape visualization because we are 
moving more and more into this direction. People’s eyes glaze over 
charts and tables, but show them a landscape and they are there, they 
are right there, and they read them in very sophisticated ways. All of 
us are quite sophisticated in our understanding of landscapes. The 
reason why this is cartoonlike is that Greenpeace got sued when they 
showed climate change on real streetscapes; the property owners 
said: you have reduced the value of our property, so now researchers 
use non-recognizable streets. If you show people things like climate 
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change impacts or adaptation strategies in a context they recognize, 
they can have very sophisticated discussions about this. This is about 
communicating complexity in different ways. Here is a fairly attrac-
tive Vancouver intersection, and here is an alternative version. You 
can have a 3-hour workshop on that image; everything is there: re-
newable energy, life-work, food production, green space transit, it is 
all there in ways people can understand and respond to. 
I want to almost end by telling you briefly about a project we are just 
starting. We hope to engage tens of thousands of Vancouver citizens. 
We start with the public and the goals the city has declared − their 
so-called green city goals − and we are going to set up five channels, 
workshops, mobile application, table top games and kiosks, online 
events, and performing arts, wrapping the whole thing in social me-
dia and different forms of invitations to engage. The city is our part-
ner in this, and then there will be an evaluation process. We want to 
know who is invited and who plays, who engages in this stuff, how 
do they participate? How do the different media and channels import 
their engagement, and what do they say at the end of the process? We 
see an opportunity to evaluate the different modes of appeal of these 
different ways. Do we really have dialogue going on? Persistence over 
time, impact in both cognitive and non-cognitive ways, and deep or 
average commitment, that is on the evaluation of the modes of en-
gagement, but we also want to evaluate the content. What are they 
saying? What do people choose? What do they say about policy? So 
that is the project; it is just getting started so I can say anything, but in 
two years’ time we will have done something. 
I want to end by making the very simple point that everybody knows. 
If we talk about the future and the changes of the world and making 
choices, it is not just about the future. There are lots of things wrong 
today that we also need to change. So future studies is present studies 
and it has to be present studies. Thank you very much.
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